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Cooperation preferences and framing e¤ects
Aurélie Dariely
February 12, 2013
Abstract
This paper presents the results from an experiment investigating whether framing a¤ects the
elicitation and predictive power of preferences for cooperation, i.e., the willingness to cooper-
ate with others. Cooperation preferences are elicited in three treatments using the method of
Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr (2001). The treatments vary two features of their method: the
sequence and order in which the contributions of other group members are presented. The
predictive power of the elicited preferences is evaluated in a one-shot and a nitely-repeated
public-good game. I nd that the order in which the contributions of others are presented, by
and large, has no impact on the elicited preferences and their predictive power. In contrast,
presenting the contributions of others in a sequence has a pronounced e¤ect on the elicited
preferences and reduces substantially their predictive power. Overall, elicited preferences are
more accurate at predicting behavior when otherscontributions are presented simultaneously
and in ascending order, like in Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr (2001).
JEL codes: C91, H41
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1 Introduction
This paper presents the results from a laboratory experiment investigating the sensitivity of coop-
eration preferences to framing e¤ects. Cooperation preferences can be dened as the willingness
to cooperate with others when private and group interest are at odds (Fischbacher and Gächter,
2010). Evidence from laboratory experiments indicates that, while some people are unwilling to
cooperate with others, many individuals are willing to cooperate provided that others in their
group do the same (e.g., Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr, 2001; Kocher et al., 2008; Rustagi, Engel
and Kosfeld, 2010; Thöni, Tyran and Wengström, 2012). At the same time, there is also evidence
that framing a¤ects cooperation in public-good games and other social dilemmas. Despite this, it
remains unknown whether cooperation preferences are sensitive to framing e¤ects.
A framing e¤ect is said to occur when seemingly supercial changes in the presentation of
a task a¤ect behavior without a¤ecting material incentives. For example, Andreoni (1995) nds
that contributions in a public-good game are considerably lower when the experimental instructions
emphasize the negative externality imposed to others by not contributing to the public good, than
when they highlight the positive externality generated by contributions. Similarly, individuals are
more likely to cooperate with others when the prisoners dilemma is called the "Community Game"
than when it is called the "Wall Street Game" (Kay and Ross, 2003; Liberman et al., 2004; Ross
and Ward, 1996) or the "Stock Market Game" (Ellingsen et al., 2012).1
Recent studies have argued that framing a¤ects cooperation not by changing preferences, but
by changing beliefs about the actions of others (Dufwenberg et al. 2011; Ellingsen et al., 2012;
Nikiforakis, 2010). However, none of the aforementioned studies has elicited individualsprefer-
ences for cooperation. Framing has been known to a¤ect choices in non-strategic environments
where beliefs about the actions of others should play no role, such as when choosing a lottery
(e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1986). Therefore, it remains an open question whether cooperation
preferences are una¤ected by framing.
To elicit cooperation preferences in the present experiment I use the method of Fischbacher,
Gächter and Fehr (2001; henceforth, FGF). This method has been used in a number of studies,
including Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) who showed that the elicited preferences for cooperation
are positively correlated with contributions in a nitely-repeated public-good game.2 Participants
1Other studies that nd framing e¤ects in social dilemmas are Bougherara, Denant-Boemont, Masclet (2011),
Brandts and Schwieren (2009), Brewer and Kramer (1986), Cookson (2000) , Cubitt et al., (2011), Fosgaard, Garn
Hansen and Wengström (2011), Kotani, Managi, Tanaka (2008), McCusker and Carnevale (1995), McDaniel and
Sistrunk (1991), Nikiforakis (2010), Park (2000), Rege and Telle (2004), Sell and Son (1997), Sonnemans et al.
(1998), van Dijk and Wilke (2000), and Willinger and Zielgelmeyer (1999).
2For other studies using this method see Burlando and Guala (2005), Cheung (2012), Herrmann and Thöni
(2009), Kocher et al., (2008), Muller, Sefton, Steinberg, Vesterlund (2008), Rustagi, Engel and Kosfeld (2010),
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in the experiment are asked in an incentive-compatible way to state how much they are willing to
contribute to a public account given the average contribution of the othersgroup members. The
elicited contribution schedules reect a subjects cooperation preferences. The ndings indicate
that the majority of participants provides monotonic and increasing contribution schedules. That
is, they are willing to contribute more as the average contribution of others increases.
In the present study, framing takes the form of altering the way in which the strategy method
is administered. Two features of the FGF method, as it has been used so far, are that the possible
contributions of others are presented (i) simultaneously in a table, and (ii) in an order (i.e., 0,
1, 2, ... 20). These features, however, could a¤ect the elicited preferences for cooperation. For
example, the ordering of otherscontributions could serve as a cue for subjects to condition their
contribution on that of others. Similarly, the simultaneous frame in the strategy method may place
subjects in a "cold" state when making their decisions (e.g., Brandts and Charness, 2000; Brosig,
Weimann and Yang, 2003; Gueth, Huck, and Mueller, 2001), while the sequential frame may place
them in a state that is more similar to that in the standard public-good game. At the same time,
however, ordering and sequentiality could a¤ect the level of noise in the elicitation of cooperation
preferences and a¤ect its predictive power.3
The experiment consists of three parts. In the rst part, I elicit subjectscooperation pref-
erences using the FGF method under three di¤erent frames. In the CONTROL treatment, all
possible contributions of others are presented simultaneously in a table, but, unlike FGF, in a ran-
dom order. In the second treatment (ORDERED), as in FGF, the possible contributions of others
are presented simultaneously and in an ascending order. In the third treatment (SEQUENTIAL),
the possible contributions of the other group members are presented in the same random order as
in the CONTROL treatment, but sequentially, one by one. In the second and third part of the
experiment, I evaluate the predictive power of the elicited cooperation preferences in a one-shot
and a nitely-repeated public-good game in which subjects are rematched in every period.
In a recent article, Levy-Garboua, Maa, Masclet and Terracol (2012) elicit subjects risk
preferences using the Holt and Laury (2002) method under a variety of frames and nd that
both the ordering of options as well as whether choices are made simultaneously or sequentially
a¤ect the consistency of choices and the extent of risk aversion.4 These ndings suggest that the
Thöni, Tyran and Wengström (2009), and Volk, Thöni and Ruigrok (2012).
3For example, Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) classify 10 percent of their subjects as "confused" if they could
not be classied as either selsh, conditionally cooperative or triangular. The authors report that contributions in
the nitely-repeated game of confused subjects were not well predicted by their contribution schedules.
4A subject is said to be inconsistent in Levy-Garboua et al. (2012) when their preferences cannot be explained
with a standard utility function. The authors nd that the rate of inconsistent choices and the level of risk aversion
are higher when choices are made sequentially, and when choices are not orderred. Levy-Garboua et al. (2012) do
not test the predictive power of the elicited risk preferences.
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number of participants with non-monotonic elicited cooperation preferences may be higher in the
SEQUENTIAL relative to the CONTROL treatment but lower in the ORDERED compared to
the CONTROL treatment.5. However, it is unclear under which condition the elicited preferences
will be better predictors of actual contributions in the public-good game. For example, although
the extent of noise may be greater in the SEQUENTIAL relative to the CONTROL treatment,
contribution schedules may still be better predictors of behavior, if the sequential frame places
individuals in a similar (hot) state as in the one-shot and nitely-repeated game.
The experimental results indicate that this is not the case. The predictive power of the con-
tribution schedules is higher in CONTROL than in SEQUENTIAL, both in the one-shot and in
the nitely-repeated game. This is partly due to the high number of individuals providing non-
monotonic contribution schedules (90 percent of all subjects in this treatment). In contrast, the
ordering of otherscontributions, by and large, does not a¤ect the predictive power of the elicited
schedules. This is the case, despite the fact that, similar to Levy-Garboua et al. (2012), the rate
of participantswith non-monotonic contribution schedules is higher in CONTROL (50 percent)
than in ORDERED (30 percent). In general, the frames a¤ect neither contributions nor beliefs
in the rst two parts of the experiment, but some di¤erences are observed in the third part in
SEQUENTIAL. I conclude that the simultaneous presentation of otherscontributions in an order
are appealing features of the FGF method.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, I present the experimental design in detail.
In section 3, I discuss the experimental results, while section 4 concludes.
2 The experiment
The experiment consists of three parts. The existence of the three parts is public knowledge, but
participants are not informed about the content of each part in advance. In the rst part, I elicit
participantscontribution schedules using variants of the FGF strategy method. In the second part,
participants play a one-shot public-good game, and in the third part, they play a nitely-repeated
version of the game. The experiment consists of three treatments. The treatment manipulation
occurs only in the rst part of the experiment. The second and third part are identical across
treatments.
This section begins by presenting the basic public-good game. This is followed by a detailed
presentation of each of the three parts and the experimental treatments. The section concludes
with a discussion of the experimental procedures.
5As I discuss later in the paper, non-monotonic contribution schedules cannot be explained by most standard
models used to explain behavior in social dilemmas.
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2.1 The public-good game
Participants are randomly divided into groups of three players. Each group member is given an
endowment of 20 tokens and has to decide how to divide them between a private and a public
account. The payo¤ function for each group member i is:
i = 20  gi + 0:5
3X
j=1
gj;
where gi 2 f0; 1; :::20g is the contribution of individual i to the public account. The marginal
return of the public account is 0.5, i.e., contributing 1 token to the public account yields a private
return of 0.5. Therefore, if an individual wishes to maximize his/her material payo¤, s/he should
not contribute to the public account. However, since there are three individuals in the group, each
token contributed to the public account increases group earnings by 1.5. Therefore, there is a
tension between private and group interest.
In the one-shot public-good game, individuals wishing to maximize their material payo¤have a
dominant strategy to contribute zero to the public account. However, as mentioned, this prediction
fails to account for the fact that many subjects contribute positive amounts to the public account,
and the fact that many of them are classied as "conditional cooperators", i.e. individuals who
contribute if they believe others do so. Fehr and Schmidt (1999, Proposition IV) show that if some
group members dislike inequality in material payo¤s su¢ ciently, then positive contributions can
be sustained in equilibrium in the public-good game. The authors also show that the contribution
of inequality-averse individuals will increase monotonically with the average contribution of other
players in their group. Therefore, the model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) provides an explanation
for conditional cooperation in public-good experiments.6 The intuition is that the inequality-
averse individuals will su¤er from the inequality when contributing less than the others. Similar
predictions are obtained using the model of Bolton and Ockenfels (2000).
2.2 Eliciting contribution schedules and beliefs
In the rst part of the experiment, I employ the method of Fischbacher, Gächter, Fehr (2001)
for eliciting contribution schedules in the public-good game. Participants are randomly matched
to form an anonymous group of three players and told that they will have to make three kinds
of decisions. First, they have to decide on an unconditional contribution to the public account.
6Note that the Fehr-Schmidt model cannot readily explain conditional cooperation in the experiment of FGF
(or the one in this paper) as subjects are allowed to condition their behavior only on the average contribution of
their peers and not on the existence or the extent of inequality in earnings.
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Second, they have to decide how much they are willing to contribute for each possible (rounded)
average contribution of the other two members of his group (0,1,...20). I will refer to this set of 21
decisions as the contribution schedule. Third, participants have to estimate the (rounded) average
unconditional contribution of the other two group members.
The three treatments di¤er only with regards to the way in which the contribution schedule is
elicited. In the CONTROL treatment, the possible contributions of the other group members are
presented simultaneously, i.e, in a contribution table, but in a random order.7 In the ORDERED
treatment, all possible contributions by the other group members are presented simultaneously
in a table, in an ascending order. That is, the ORDERED treatment replicates the design of
FGF. In the SEQUENTIAL treatment, the ordering of otherscontributions was the same as in
the CONTROL treatment, but otherscontributions were presented sequentially, in 21 successive
screens.
All decisions are incentive compatible. In particular, after all participants made their decisions,
two subjects in each group were randomly selected and their unconditional contribution was the
one relevant for determining their contribution to the public account. For the third subject,
the contribution schedule determined their contribution to the public account. In particular,
their contribution was chosen based on their contribution schedule and the average unconditional
contribution of the other two group members. To incentivize participants to thruthfully reveal
their beliefs, they are told that they will receive 3 tokens for stating a belief that exactly matches
the average contribution of the other two group members. If their belief is within +/-1 of the
average, they will receive 2 tokens. If their estimate is within +/-2 of the average they will receive
1 token. Otherwise, they will not receive any additional tokens.
2.3 The one-shot public-good game
In the second part of the experiment, participants are informed that they will be placed in a new
group and that they will play a one-shot public-good game. The one-shot game allows to analyze
playersindividual responses in a one-shot interaction without repetition e¤ect and learning.
In order to evaluate the predictive power of the individualscontribution schedule, I also elicite
their beliefs about the average contribution of the other group members. Furthermore, to avoid
choices in the strategy method a¤ecting decisions in the one-shot game, participants do not receive
feedback about the outcomes of the rst part of the experiment.
7The order was determined by placing 21 numbered pieces of paper in a basket and picking them out sequentially
and without replacement before the start of the rst experimental session. The order was kept constant in subsequent
sessions.
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2.4 The nitely-repeated public-good game
At the start of the third and nal part of the experiment, participants are informed that they
will play the public-good game for ten periods and that the composition of their group would be
randomly determined at the start of each period. I note that, following Fischbacher and Gächter
(2010), before playing the nitely-repeated game, they are informed about their earnings from
the rst and second part of the experiment, and the average contributions of their fellow group
members. In each period, participants have to decide how much to contribute to the public account
and, in addition, provide an estimate of how much they believe the other two group members would
contribute on average. Participants receive feedback similar to that in the one-shot game at the
end of each period.
2.5 Procedures
The experiment was conducted at the University of Zurich using Z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Three
sessions were run for each treatment with a total of 96 participants (30 in CONTROL, 33 in OR-
DERED, and 33 in SEQUENTIAL). Each subject participated only in one experimental treatment.
At the beginning of each session participants were randomly allocated to a closed cubicle, where
they could make their decisions in complete anonymity from the other participants. Sessions
lasted on average 90 minutes and participants earned 46.17 CHF on average. At the time of the
experiment, the exchange rate between the Swiss Franc and the American Dollar was 1 CHF=$1.23
The experimental instructions were adopted from FGF and given to subjects on paper. In-
structions for Part 1 were handed out rst. Participants were informed that there would be a
second and third part to the experiment, but they had no prior knowledge of what the content of
these parts would be. Instructions for the second part were not handed out until the end of rst
part, and similarly for the third part. In the instructions, the contribution table was presenting
and explained in the CONTROL and ORDERED treatments. In the SEQUENTIAL treatment,
two screens were presented to the participants and they did no know the sequence of others
contribution before playing the game.
After participants had read the instructions, they had to answer control questions which tested
their understanding of the experiment. The experiment did not start until all participants had
answered correctly the control questions. The procedures for the second and third part of the
experiment were the same. At the end of the experiment the total amount of tokens earned by
participants was converted to Swiss francs at the rate of 1 token = 0.6 CHF for the strategy method
and the one-shot game, and, since each individual made 10 decisions in the third part, at the rate
of 1 token = 0.06 CHF for the nitely-repeated game.
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3 Results
This section is divided into four parts. The rst part examines the impact of the di¤erent frames
on the contribution schedules and, in particular, whether it a¤ects the rate of non-monotonic
contribution schedules. The second part investigates the predictive power of the contribution
schedules under the di¤erent frames in the one-shot public-good game, while the third part does
the same for the nitely-repeated game. The fourth part discusses other experimental ndings
such as the impact of the di¤erent frames on the distribution of cooperation preferences and the
levels of contribution in the one-shot and nitely-repeated games.
3.1 Non-monotonic contribution schedules
All studies using the FGF method for eliciting cooperation preferences nd that a non-trivial
fraction of individuals provides non-monotonic contribution schedules. As mentioned, there are
reasons to expect that there may be more (less) non-monotonic contribution schedules in the
SEQUENTIAL (ORDERED) treatment compared to the CONTROL treatment.
Let G denote the average contribution of ones group members, G 2 f0; 1; :::20g; and gi(G) the
contribution of individual i given the average contribution of his peers. A contribution schedule
is weakly monotonic if gi(G+ 1)  gi(G) for all G 2 [0; 19], or gi(G + 1)  gi(G). A contribution
schedule that does not satisfy either of these conditions is non-monotonic. For example, an indi-
vidual who always contributes gi(G) = 0 has a weakly monotonic schedule. A perfect conditional
cooperator contributes gi(G) = G and has a strictly monotonic schedule. An individual who con-
tributes gi(0) = 0; gi(1) = 2; gi(2) = 1;and gi(3) = 4 has a non-monotonic schedule. To have a
measure of how "noisy" these schedules are, I will sometimes refer to the number of switches in
the non-monotonic schedule of an individual. For example, in the previous example, individual i
made one switch when he contributed gi(2) = 1 (since before that he had an increasing contribu-
tion schedule), and a second switch when he contributed gi(3) = 4.8 The individual contribution
schedules can be seen in Appendix A.
Result 1: The proportion of individuals with non-monotonic contribution schedules is substantially
higher in the SEQUENTIAL treatment than in the CONTROL treatment, and substantially lower
in the ORDERED treatment than in the CONTROL treatment.
8Such contribution schedules are di¢ cult to reconcile with most models of social preferences as discussed in
the previous section. Models of non-linear altruism could provide a justication for non-monotonic contribution
schedules. According to these models an individual could contribute more when she believes other contribute low
amounts, and less when others contribute more. These models however cannot account for contribution schedules
exhibiting multiple "switching points". Most subjects who do not have a weakly monotonic schedule have multiple
switching points (9 out of 10 in ORDERED, 25 out of 29 in SEQUENTIAL and 12 out of 15 in CONTOL).
8
SUPPORT: Figure 1 shows that the proportion of individuals with a non-monotonic contribution
schedule is 50.0 percent in CONTROL, 30.3 percent in ORDERED, and 87.9 percent in SE-
QUENTIAL. A Chi-square test using each individual as an independent observation indicates that
the rate of non-monotonic contribution schedules is statistically higher in SEQUENTIAL than in
CONTROL (p value=0.0011) and ORDERED (p value=0.0001). While the rate is considerably
higher in CONTROL than in the ORDERED (65 percent higher), the di¤erence marginally fails
to be signicant at a conventional level (p value=0.1292).9
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Figure 1: Percentage of subjects with non-monotonic contribution
schedules
Result 2: The average number of switches is signicantly greater in the SEQUENTIAL than in the
CONTROL treatment. The number of switches is not signicantly di¤erent in the ORDERED and
in the CONTROL treatment. Amongst the subjects with non-monotonic contribution schedules,
the average number of switches does not di¤er signicantly across treatments.
SUPPORT: The average number of switches is 2.0 in the CONTROL treatment, 3.5 in SEQUEN-
TIAL and 1.2 in ORDERED. Since there are more than two treatments, I rst report the results
9For completeness, I report that the rate of non-monotonic contribution schedules is signicantly higher in
SEQUENTIAL than in ORDERED (p value=0.0001).
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from a two-tailed Kruskal-Wallis test. I then proceed to pair-wise treatment comparisons only if the
Kruskal-Wallis indicates signicant di¤erences across treatments. The Kruskal-Wallis test reveals a
signicant di¤erence across treatments (p value=0.0001). Using a two-tailed Mann-Whitney test
with each individual as an independent observation, I nd that the di¤erence is signicant between
CONTROL and SEQUENTIAL and (p value=0.0084). The di¤erence between CONTROL and
ORDERED narrowly misses the 10-percent level of signicance (p value=0.1084).10 Neverthe-
less, the number of switches amongst individuals with non-monotonic schedules is similar across
treatments (3.9 in ORDERED, 4.0 in CONTROL and 4.0 in SEQUENTIAL) and not signicantly
di¤erent (Kruskal-Wallis; p value=0.8776). This indicates that the di¤erence in the number of
switches on average is due to the higher percentage of non-monotonic contribution schedules in
SEQUENTIAL (see Result 1).
The greater extent of non-monotonic schedules in SEQUENTIAL may be partly attributed to
the fact that individuals cannot revise their choices once made. However, half of the participants
also fail to report a weakly monotonic contribution schedule even in CONTROL where revisions
are possible. Given the impact of the frames on the monotonicity of contribution schedules, the
next subsection investigates whether and how the di¤erent frames also a¤ect the predictive power
in the one-shot public-good game.
3.2 Predictive power of schedules in the one-shot public-good game
A natural way to investigate the predictive power of the contribution schedules is to examine
whether the actual contributions of participants in the one-shot game deviate from those in the
contribution schedules. Recall that participants were asked to state how much they believed their
peers would contribute on average in the one-shot game. Following Fischbacher and Gächter
(2010), I use this belief and the contribution schedule to obtain a prediction about how much an
individual will contribute in the one-shot game. For example, if someone believes that his peers
will contribute on average 5, the predicted contribution is obtained by looking at the contribution
the individual stated he would make if the others contributed 5 on average in the contribution
schedule.
Result 3: On average, contribution schedules are accurate predictors of contributions in the one-
shot game only in the ORDERED treatment.
SUPPORT: Let Deviation be the di¤erence between a subjects actual and predicted contribution.
Figure 2 presents the distribution of Deviation in each treatment. As can be easily seen, relative
10The di¤erence between SEQUENTIAL and ORDERED is highly signicant (p value=0.0000)
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to the CONTROL treatment, more subjects deviate from the predicted contribution in the SE-
QUENTIAL treatment, and less in the ORDERED treatment. The average deviation is 1.4 tokens
in CONTROL, 1.8 tokens in SEQUENTIAL and 0.2 in the ORDERED. A two-tailed Wilcoxon
signed-rank test using each individual as an independent observation indicates that the deviation
is not signicantly di¤erent from 0 in the ORDERED condition (p value=0.8266), but it is in the
CONTROL (p value=0.0653) and in the SEQUENTIAL treatment (p value=0.0047).11
The average deviation from the predicted contribution is one obvious indicator for evaluating
the predictive power of contribution schedules. In this case, however, it masks the fact that the
schedules predict perfectly the contribution of nearly 50 percent of subjects in the CONTROL and
ORDERED treatments. Figure 2 shows that the relative e¢ cacy of the schedules in ORDERED
is due to the (roughly) equal number of positive and negative deviations from the predicted con-
tribution. For this reason, next, I investigate the predictive power of the contribution schedules
using a di¤erent measure.
11This di¤erence is not statistically signicant between SEQUENTIAL and CONTROL (p value=0.3300). De-
spite the large di¤erence, a Mann-Whitney test fails to reject the hypothesis that average devation is the same
in ORDERED and CONTROL (p value=0.2406). The di¤erence in average devation between ORDERED and
SEQUENTIAL is statistically signicant (p value=0.0375).
11
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Figure 2: Distribution of deviation from the predicted contribution
in the one-shot game.
Result 4: Relative to the CONTROL treatment, the probability an individuals contribution dif-
fers from their predicted contribution is higher in SEQUENTIAL, and (insignicantly) lower in
ORDERED. This probability of deviation is higher for individuals with noisy contribution schedules
and for those with high beliefs about the contribution of their peers.
SUPPORT: Table 1 reports the results from a regression analysis investigating the determinants
of an individuals deviation from their predicted contribution. The dependent variable is a binary
variable taking the value of 1 if Deviation 6= 0 and the value of 0 if Deviation= 0: Model 1 includes
only treatment dummies as regressors (CONTROL being the omitted category). The regression
shows that the probability of deviating from the predicted contribution is 22.6 percent higher
in SEQUENTIAL than in CONTROL (p value=0.050). The di¤erence between CONTROL and
ORDERED is small (1.5 percent) and statistically insignicant (p value=0.904). Model 2 includes
the variable "Switcher" as an explanatory variable. Switcher is a dummy variable taking the
value of 1 if the contribution schedule of a particular individual includes more than 1 switches.12
12The rationale for this is that, as mentioned earlier, none of the standard models of social preference can account
for more than one switches. Note that "triangle" contributors have one switch in their contribution schedules.
12
Model 2 indicates that the probability a "switcher" deviates from his predicted contribution is
31.38 percent higher than that of a non-switcher (p value=0.003). The fact that the size of the
SEQUENTIAL coe¢ cient is approximately halved and is no longer signicantly di¤erent from
zero (p value=0.326) indicates that the di¤erence across the two treatments is mainly due to the
higher number of individuals with non-monotonic contribution schedules in this treatment. To test
this explanation further, I ran a regression which in addition to the regressors in Model 2, included
interaction terms between the treatment and switcher dummies (not reported). The only signicant
variable in this regression is the Switcher variable (marg. e¤ect: 36.27 percent; p value=0.047).
The coe¢ cient for SEQUENTIAL is slightly lower than in Model 2 and remains statistically
insigicant (marg. e¤ect: 10.78 percent; p value=0.591). The fact that the interaction terms are
insignicant indicates the switchers are as likely to deviate from the predicted contribution in all
treatments and corroborates Result 2. Model 3 adds an individuals Belief as a regressor. The
results indicate that the higher the belief of an individual about the average contribution of his
peers, the higher is the probability they deviate from their predicted contribution (marginal e¤ect:
3.22 percent; p value=0.005). This seems intuitive. For example, while an individual may have
stated that she would contribute 15 if she knew for sure that others did the same (strategy method),
in the one-shot game, she cannot be sure whether this will be the case. Therefore, she may be
more likely to deviate from her predicted contribution than if she believed others would contribute
5. The reason is that participants, on average, contribute less than their beliefs. Therefore, the
extent of the deviation is lower when beliefs are low. A similar nding regarding beliefs is also
reported in Fischbacher and and Gächter (2010). Finally, Model 4 replaces the Switcher dummy
variable with the total number of switches in an individuals contribution schedule. As can be seen,
the higher the number of switches in a contribution schedule, the higher is the probability that an
individual deviates from his predicted contribution (p value=0.015):13 The marginal e¤ect shows
that an additional switch in the contribution schedule increases the probability of deviating from
the predicted contribution by 6.21 percent.
3.3 Predictive power of schedules in the nitely-repeated public-good
game
The approach for evaluating the predictive power of the contribution schedules in the nitely-
repeated game is the same as in the previous section. In each of the ten periods, I estimate an
13The results are qualitatively una¤ected if we use dummies to control for the number of switches instead of the
total number of switches.
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Model 1 2 3 4
ORDERED 0.0147 0.0588 0.0678 0.0872
(0.1227) (0.1252) (0.1299) (0.1303)
SEQUENTIAL 0.2263** 0.1273 0.1219 0.1414
(0.1153) (0.1296) (0.1336) (0.1300)
Switcher 0.3138*** 0.2933***
(0.1041) (0.1089)
Beliefs 0.0322*** 0.0308***
(0.0113) (0.0113)
Totalswitch 0.0621**
(0.0255)
Observations 96 96 96 96
Table 1: Probability of deviating from predicted contribution in the one-shot game. Probit re-
gression. Entries are marginal e¤ects. Standard errors are in parentheses. *p-value<0.1,**p-
value<0.05,***p-value<0.01
individuals Deviation by comparing their actual to their predicted contribution.14
Result 5: Contribution schedules accurately predict contributions in the nitely-repeated game in
the CONTROL and the ORDERED treatments, but not in the SEQUENTIAL treatment.
SUPPORT: Figure 3 presents the distribution of Deviation in each treatment. As can be seen,
more subjects appear to deviate from their predicted contribution in the SEQUENTIAL than in
the CONTROL treatment. The CONTROL and ORDERED treatments give similar results. The
average deviation across the 10 periods is 0.3 in CONTROL, -0.6 in the ORDERED, and 1.4 in
SEQUENTIAL. To control for the panel nature of the data in the third part of the experiment,
I ran a linear regression controlling for random e¤ects at the session level. The average deviation
is signicantly di¤erent from zero in SEQUENTIAL (p value=0.003), but not in CONTROL
and ORDERED (p value=0.637 and 0.322, respectively):15 These results are robust if I evaluate
behavior at di¤erent points of part 3, such as in period 1 and the rst ve periods.
14Note that participants received feedback about the contributions of their peers and their private earnings at
the end of each period, but also at the start of the rst period (i.e., regarding decisions in the one-shot game).
15Average deviation is signcantly di¤erent between SEQUENTIAL and CONTROL (p value=0.081), and be-
tween ORDERED and SEQUENTIAL (p value=0.005). Average devation is not signicantly di¤erent between
ORDERED and CONTROL (p value=0.302).
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Figure 3: Distribution of deviation from the predicted contribution
in the nitely-repeated game
Result 6: The probability an individuals contribution di¤ers from their predicted contribution in
the nitely-repeated game is higher in SEQUENTIAL than in CONTROL. The di¤erence between
CONTROL and ORDERED is not statistically signicant. The probability of deviating from the
predicted contribution is higher for individuals with noisy contribution schedules and with high
beliefs about the contribution of their peers.
SUPPORT: Table 2 reports the results from a regression analysis investigating the determinants
of an individuals deviation from their predicted contribution. The dependent variable, as in the
previous subsection, is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if Deviation 6= 0 and the value of 0
if Deviation= 0 for a given subject in a given period: Given the interdependence of contributions
at the session level, the model controls for random e¤ects at the session level. The logic of the
empirical investigation is the same as in the previous section for the one-shot game, building the
model up gradually.
The results in Table 2 are qualitatively the same as those in Table 1 for the one-shot game.
The regression shows that the probability of a subject deviating from her predicting contribution
is 29.5 percent higher in the SEQUENTIAL than in the CONTROL treatment (p value<0.001).
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Contributions in the ORDERED treatment are 4.9 percent less likely to di¤er from the pre-
dicted contribution than in the CONTROL treatment, but the di¤erence is far from being sta-
tistically signicant (p value=0.427). Model 2 shows that a "Switcher", that is, an individual
with noisy contribution schedule is 28.2 percent more likely to deviate from his predicted contri-
bution (p value<0.001). However, unlike in the one-shot game, the coe¢ cient for SEQUENTIAL
remains signicant in Model 2 (p value=0.002), although the coe¢ cient drops from 28.2 to 21.1
percent. Model 3 controls for an individuals Belief about others contribution. Similar to the one-
shot game, the higher the belief of an individual about the average contribution of her peers, the
higher is the probability she deviates from her predicted contribution (marg. e¤ect: 4.7 percent;
(p value<0.001). Note that the coe¢ cient for SEQUENTIAL is no longer signicant in Model 3.
This indicates that the higher rate of deviations in this treatment is mostly due to the higher beliefs
about the contributions of others.16 Model 4 replaces the Switcher variable with the total number
of switches in an individuals contribution schedule, and adds a (linear) control for time e¤ects.
The results indicate that the higher the number of switches in a contribution schedule, the higher is
the probability that an individual deviates from his predicted contribution (p value<0.001). The
marginal e¤ect shows that, similar to the one-shot game, an additional switch in the contribution
schedule increases the probability of deviating from the predicted contribution by 6 percent. The
probability of deviating from ones predicted contribution decreases by 1 percent in every period.
The reason is that, as in all public-good experiments, contributions decline over time. As we will
see in the next subsection, most people contribute small amounts in response to low contribution
by their peers.
3.4 Cooperation preferences, contribution levels and beliefs
So far, the analysis has focused on how the di¤erent frames a¤ect the monotonicity and predictive
power of the contribution schedules. In this section, I investigate the impact of the di¤erent frames
on the levels of contribution in the three parts of the experiment and subjectsbeliefs. Before doing
this, however, I will examine how the frames impact the di¤erent types of cooperation preferences
seen in previous studies. Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr (2001) proposed a classication of the
16To test this explanation, I ran a regression separately for each treatment with the sole regressors being Switcher
and Belief. The latter is always statistically signicant, while the former is signcant in all treatments except in the
SEQUENTIAL. A closer inspection at the data indicates the both switchers and non-switchers have substantially
higher levels of beliefs in this treatment. As a result, both are about 75 percent likely to deviate from their predicted
contribution - a rate which is considerably higher than in the other treatments. I discuss the impact of framing on
contributions and beliefs in more detail in the next subsection.
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Model 1 2 3 4
ORDERED -0.0492 -0.0127 -0.03480 -0.0154
(0.0620) (0.0725) (0.0576) (0.0592)
SEQUENTIAL 0.2950*** 0.2112*** 0.0646 0.0717
(0.0558) (0.0690) (0.0610) (0.0616)
Switcher 0.2822*** 0.2649***
(0.0346) 0.0356
Beliefs 0.0474*** 0.0486***
(0.0059) (0.0063)
Totalswitch 0.0603***
(0.0079)
Period 0.0107*
(0.0063)
Observations 960 960 960 960
Table 2: Probability of deviating from predicted contribution in the nitely-repeated game. Probit
regression with random e¤ects at the session level. Entries are marginal e¤ects. Standard errors
are in parentheses. *p-value<0.1,**p-value<0.05,***p-value<0.01
di¤erent patterns observed in the contribution schedules. In particular, individuals that always
contribute zero in the strategy method, irrespective of the contribution of their peers, are classied
as "free riders". Individuals who have a contribution schedule with either a weakly monotonic
pattern with at least one increase or a positive Spearman rank correlation signicant at the 1-
percent level are classied as "conditional cooperators".17 "Triangle contributors" are participants
who have a signicantly increasing schedule up to some maximum and a signicantly decreasing
schedule thereafter, using again as a criterion the Spearman rank test at the 1-percent level of
signicance. Participants that could not be classied in one of the above categories are classied
as "others" or "confused".
Treatments/types in percent CONTROL ORDERED SEQUENTIAL
Free Riders 30.00 36.36 3.03
Conditional Cooperators 43.33 39.39 78.79
Triangles 3.33 3.03 0.00
Others 23.33 21.21 18.18
Table 3 : Type classication in percentage
17Note that conditional cooperators can have non-monotonic schedules and, indeed, some of them did.
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Result 7: The sequential frame has a pronounced impact on the elicited contribution schedules
relative to the CONTROL treatment. In contrast, the ordering of the otherscontribution does not
a¤ect the elicited contribution schedules.
SUPPORT: Table 3 presents the results of the FGF classication method in each treatment. While
the distribution of types appears to be similar in CONTROL and ORDERED, it is strikingly
di¤erent in SEQUENTIAL. As can be seen, only 1 out of 33 participants (3 percent) can be
classied as selsh in the SEQUENTIAL treatment, compared to 12 out of 33 in the ORDERED
treatment (36.4 percent), and 9 out of 30 in the CONTROL treatment (30 percent). Similarly, 43
percent of individuals are classied as conditional cooperators in the CONTROL treatment, 39.4
percent in ORDERED, and 78.8 percent in SEQUENTIAL.18 A Fischers exact test rejects the
hypothesis that the distribution of types is the same across the three treatments (p value=0.003).
Pairwise Fischer exact tests reveal that this di¤erence is due to the SEQUENTIAL treatment. In
particular, the di¤erence between CONTROL and SEQUENTIAL is signicant (p value=0.004),
while that between ORDERED and CONTROL is not (p value=0.947).
18It is also worthwhile pointing out that only 3 of the 13 individuals classied as conditional cooperators in OR-
DERED have a non-monotonic contribution schedule. In contrast, 8 of 13 conditional cooperators in CONTROL,
and 24 of the 26 in SEQUENTIAL have non-monotonic schedules. The proportion of conditional cooperators
with non-monotonic schedules, relative to the CONTROL treatment, is lower in ORDERED (p value=0.0183) and
higher in SEQUENTIAL (p value=0.03). Conditional cooperators are switching more often on average in SEQUEN-
TIAL (3.0 switches) and CONTROL (2.1 switches) compared to ORDERED (0.5 switches). A Mann-Whitney test
indicates that the di¤erence between ORDERED vs CONTROL is statistically signicant (p value=0.0398), while
that between CONTROL and SEQUENTIAL is not (p value=0.1239).
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Figure 4: Average conditional contribution in strategy method
Additional support for Result 7 can be found in Figure 4 and Table 4.19 Figure 4 presents
the average conditional contribution in the rst part of the experiment. Similar to previous ex-
periments, the average conditional contribution is monotonically increasing and lies below the
45-degree line in all treatments. However, as can be seen, conditional contributions tend to be
higher in SEQUENTIAL, than in the other two treatments. The results of a linear regression with
individual random e¤ects reported in Table 4 conrm that the average conditional contribution
di¤ers signicantly in SEQUENTIAL. In particular, the slope of the conditional contribution is
higher by 20.9 degrees in SEQUENTIAL than in CONTROL. This di¤erence is non-trivial and
statistically signicant (p value<0.001). It implies that for every additional token contributed to
the public account by ones peers, the contribution will be 0.209 higher than in the CONTROL.
The di¤erence in slopes between CONTROL and ORDERED is smaller (5.2 degrees) and narrowly
misses the 10-percent level of signicance (p value=0.101).
Result 8: By and large, beliefs and unconditional contributions are not signicantly di¤erent
19Figure 4 and Table 4 below excludes subject 1202 who gave 20 when others gave 0 and had a Spearman
correlation coe¢ cient of -1
19
Model 1
Otherscontribution 0.3320***
(0.2296)
ORDERED 0.7085
(1.0552)
SEQUENTIAL -0.0320
(1.0474)
ORDERED * Otherscontribution -0.0524
(0.0319)
SEQUENTIAL * Otherscontribution 0.2087***
(0.0317)
Constant 0.6331
0.7580
Observations 95
Table 3: Determinants of conditional contribution in the strategy method. Linear regression with
individual random e¤ects. *p-value<0.1,**p-value<0.05,***p-value<0.01
across treatments in the rst and second part of the experiment. Contributions are higher in the
nitely-repeated game in SEQUENTIAL, due to higher beliefs about the contributions of others.
SUPPORT: [First part of the experiment] The average belief regarding othersaverage (un-
conditional) contribution in the rst part of the experiment is 7.16 (CONTROL), 5 (ORDERED),
and 8 (SEQUENTIAL). A Kruskal-Wallis test rejects the hypothesis that beliefs are the same across
treatments (p value=0.0408). Using a two-tailed Mann-Whitney test with each individual as an
independent observation, the di¤erence between CONTROL and ORDERED is marginally sta-
tistically signicant (p value=0.0999), while that between CONTROL and SEQUENTIAL is not
(p value=0.6265). In contrast, a Kruskal-Wallis test fails to reject the hypothesis that subjects
unconditional contributions (6.23, 4.42, 6.57, in CONTROL, ORDERED and SEQUENTIAL,
respectively) are the same across treatments in the rst part of the experiment (p value=0.1413).
[Second part of the experiment] A Kruskal-Wallis test fails to reject the hypothesis that
subjectsbeliefs (6.03, 5.81, 6.72, in CONTROL, ORDERED and SEQUENTIAL, respectively)
are the same across treatments (p value=0.6003). While the test rejects the same hypothesis
for contributions (4.93, 3.85, 5.82, in CONTROL, ORDERED and SEQUENTIAL, respectively;
p value=0.0703), a two-tailed Mann-Whitney test with each individual as an independent obser-
vation indicates that neither the di¤erence between CONTROL and ORDERED is statistically sig-
nicant (p value=0.3170) nor is that between CONTROL and SEQUENTIAL (p value=0.2714).
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[Third part of the experiment] As can be seen in Figure 5, while contributions appear
to be very similar across all periods in CONTROL and ORDERED, contributions tend to be
higher in the SEQUENTIAL treatment than in the CONTROL. In particular, average contribu-
tion is 1.7 in CONTROL, 1.8 in ORDERED and 4.3 in SEQUENTIAL. Similarly, on average,
beliefs are higher in SEQUENTIAL (5.5), than in CONTROL (2.12) and ORDERED (2.42). This
seems surprising given that beliefs and contributions did not di¤er signicantly in the rst two
parts of the experiment (Result 7). The di¤erence appears already in the rst period of the third
part where beliefs in SEQUENTIAL are 6.2, 3.8 in CONTROL, and 4.8 in ORDERED. Given
the panel nature of the data and the use of random matching in this part of the experiment,
to compare behavior across treatments Table 5 presents the results from a linear regression with
random e¤ects at the session level. Model 1 illustrates that the di¤erence between CONTROL
and SEQUENTIAL is statistically signicant (p value=0.005), but not that between CONTROL
and ORDERED (p value=0.945). The addition of subjectsbeliefs as an explanatory variable
in Model 2 indicates that once I control for beliefs, the di¤erence between CONTROL and SE-
QUENTIAL is no longer signicant (p value=0.921). The coe¢ cient of subjectsbeliefs is highly
signicant (p value<0.001) and indicates that a one unit increase in beliefs, increases the con-
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Model 1 2 3
ORDERED 0.0708 -0.1913 -0.01871
(1.0328) (0.2533) (0.3622)
SEQUENTIAL 2.8676** -0.0276 -0.2773
(1.0328) (0.2780) (0.4298)
Period -0.2035*** 0.0201 0.0167
0.0433 (0.0369) (0.0374)
Beliefs 0.8011*** 0.7678***
(0.0342) (0.1094)
Beliefs * ORDERED 0.0025
(0.1190)
Beliefs * SEQUENTIAL 0.0660
(0.1184)
Constant 2.8173*** -0.0793 0.0099
(0.7697) (0.2961) (0.3890)
Observations 960 960 960
Table 4: Determinants of contributions in the nitely-repeated game. Linear regression with
session random e¤ects. *p-value<0.1,**p-value<0.05,***p-value<0.01
tribution of an individual by 0.80 tokens. Finally, Model 3 shows that the relationship between
beliefs and contributions is similar across treatments. This implies that higher beliefs about others
contribution drive the higher levels of contribution in SEQUENTIAL. In Appendix B, I provide
additional evidence from a regression analysis of subjectsbeliefs. I show that the higher beliefs
in SEQUENTIAL are due to a stronger relationship between contributions in parts 1 and 2 (i.e.,
the feedback subjects receive at the start of part 3), and beliefs. It is di¢ cult to explain why the
sequential frame has the e¤ect on belief formation.
4 Discussion
The aim of the experiment was to evaluate the sensitivity of cooperation preferences to changes
in the frame which have been recently shown to a¤ect the elicitation of (risk) preferences (Levy-
Garboua et al., 2012). In particular, using the method of Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr (2001;
FGF) for eliciting cooperation preferences, I varied (i) the order in which otherscontributions
appeared in the experiment, and (ii) whether these contributions were presented simultaneously
or in sequence. In addition, the experiment aimed to evaluate the predictive power of cooperation
preferences in a one-shot and a nitely-repeated public-good game. In general, I found that the
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order in which the contributions of others was presented had no impact on the elicited preferences
and their predictive power. However, presenting the contributions of others in a sequence had
a signicant e¤ect on the elicited preferences and reduced their predictive power. In this sense,
my ndings are similar to those of Levy-Garboua et al. (2012) who found that risk preferences
are a¤ected more by changes in whether the options are presented sequentially or simultaneously,
rather than the order in which the options are presented. Overall, elicited preferences are more
accurate at predicting behavior when otherscontributions are presented simultaneously and in
ascending order, like in Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr (2001).
What could explain the impact of the sequential frame in our experiment? One explanation for
the number of non-monotonic schedules in SEQUENTIAL may be that individuals cannot revise
their choices once made. While this explanation can partly account for the level of noise in the
contribution schedules, it cannot account for the much higher levels of conditional cooperation and
near absence of free riders seen in this treatment. An explanation for this nding may be that
individuals wish to maintain a positive self-image. Gneezy et al. (2011) found that donations to
charity are more likely to happen after people lie or fail to return money they had received by
mistake. The authors discuss the concept of conscience accountingwhich means that people try
to compensate badactivities to protect their identity and self-image. It seems possible that
making 21 consecutive decisions not to contribute to the public account may be more damaging
for ones self image than submitting once a table with zero contributions.
An issue which may be interesting for future study is when cooperation preferences are elicited.
Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) ran experiments with the FGF strategy method either at the start
or the end of the experiment to evaluate whether the timing of the elicitation a¤ected contributions
in a nitely-repeated game. They found that this was not the case and that contributions were the
same when cooperation preferences were elicited at the start and the end of the experiment. This
nding is the reason I elicited preferences only at the start of the experiment. However, the nding
that beliefs and contributions in the nitely-repeated game are higher in SEQUENTIAL suggests
that eliciting cooperation preferences at the start of the experiment may inuence outcomes, at
least under some frames. Therefore, it may be useful for future studies to randomize when the
strategy method is administered.
Finally, given the ndings from the present experiment, I believe that the FGF method could be
used to investigate whether other kinds of frames that have been shown to a¤ect contributions in
public-good games, such as the warm-glow/cold-prickle e¤ect of Andreoni (1995) and the labelling
of the game or strategies (e.g., Ellingsen et al., 2012; Kay and Ross, 2003; Liberman et al., 2004;
Ross and Ward, 1996) a¤ects only subjectsbeliefs, as suggested in previous articles (Dufwenberg
et al. 2011; Ellingsen et al., 2012; Nikiforakis, 2010) or also cooperation preferences.
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Appendix A: Individual contribution schedules
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Appendix A: Conditional contribution schedules per subject. CONTROL
Others' average contribution
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Appendix A. Conditional contribution schedules per subject. ORDERED
Others' average contribution
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Appendix A: Conditional contribuion schedules per subject. SEQUENTIAL
Others' average contribution
Figure A1: Individual contribution schedules
The letters on top of each subgraph indicate how that particular individual was classied
(CC: conditional cooperator; FR: free rider; TR: triangle; OT: other)
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Appendix B: Determinants of beliefs in the nitely-repeated
game
Treatments CONTROL ORDERED SEQUENTIAL
Period -0.2375*** -0.3487*** -0.2477***
(0.0302) (0.0606) (0.0570)
Average Contribution in SM 0.0912*** 0.0003 0.2371***
(0.0207) (0.0690) (0.0639)
Average Contribution in One-Shot 0.1343*** 0.2927*** 0.4484***
(0.0517) (0.0524) (0.0582)
Constant 2.1949*** 3.2171*** 2.6695***
(0.3144) (0.0504) (0.5111)
Observations 300 330 330
Linear regression with random e¤ects at the session level.
Average Contribution in SM refers to the average contribution in the strategy method
Average Contribution in One-Shot refers to the average contribution in the one-shot game
*p<0.1,**p<0.05,***p<0.01
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